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Injuries Received While Going To and From Work
The injured employee was a helper on a truck of his soft
drink bottler employer, working under supervision of
the truck driver. The custom was to load the truck in
Columbia, drive to distribution points out of Columbia and
return to Columbia with the empty bottles. The employee
assisted in loading and unloading in Columbia and at points
of distribution, riding with the truck between such places.
On the date of injury the employee overslept, failing to
arrive at the Columbia plant prior to loading and departure
of the truck for an out of town destination. The employee's
brother drove the employee by automobile toward the plant,
but several blocks away they met the loaded truck on the
street and upon mutual recognition the truck stopped as did
the car, about opposite each other on their respective sides
of the street. There had been a prior occasion of a similar
meeting and stopping and the employee boarding the truck
when he was late for work. On this latter occasion, however,
the employee was struck by an automobile and injured while
attempting to cross the street to the employer's truck.
An award for workmen's compensation benefits to the
injured employee was affirmed by the Supreme Court, Bald-
win v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company," Mr. Justice Legge dis-
sented.
The affirmance of the award to the employee was upon
several grounds. First: So long as the employee was merely
riding to work in a private vehicle he was within the rule
excluding compensability of injuries received while going to
and from work. But, when the private vehicle stopped on
the street opposite the truck on which the employee worked
regularly, and the truck stopped for the employee to board
the truck, the latter was an implied direction of the employer
for the employee to cross the street and board the truck, so
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that the employee in so doing was under the control and super-
vision of the employer; the street thereby became a part of
his work environment and the status of the employee in ef-
fect changed from a member of the public travelling the
street to the employee crossing the street incident to his em-
ployment. Second: One exception to the exclusionary rule
in such circumstances is where the employer furnishes the
transportation to and from work. Here transportation was
furnished the employee by the employer from the Columbia
plant to the out of town distribution point, and it was the
duty of the employee to ride the truck provided for that
purpose. The opinion states: "He was approaching it to
board it when injured which may fairly, under many authori-
ties, be considered to be a part of the employer-provided
transportation". Finally, the affirmance of the award of
compensability was predicated upon the often quoted rule
"that doubts are to be resolved in favor of compensability".
In Evans v. Jones-Wilson, Inc.,2 an award by the Industrial
Commission for compensation benefits to the injured em-
ployee was set aside. The employee was a mortar mixer
on a school construction job; he was required to be on the
job by 7:30 A. M. so as to have the mortar ready for the
masons who began work at 8 A. M. o'clock. On the morning
concerned he drove from his home in his privately owned pick-
up truck, arriving at the job site about 7:25 A. M. and parked
the truck on the school grounds, off the driveway about three
truck lengths from the mortar box; he pulled ,up the hand
brake, got out and was walking behind the truck to the
work area when the brake failed and the truck rolled back
injuring the employee. The employer did not furnish this
employee transportation to work and the employee's truck
was not used in the work for the employer. While the place
where the truck was parked was on the school premises, such
was not under the control of the employer, but other em-
ployees used the area for parking their vehicles without
objection.
The Court did not pass upon the issue being one on which
the previous award of compensability was predicated, that
"the defendant-employer adopted the school yard as a part of
its work premises", as it was concluded that compensability
is not determined by the mere fact of an injury on the em-
2. 235 S. C. 219, 110 S. E. 2nd 851 (1959).
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ployer's premises, but that it must also be shown that the
injury was related or incidental to the employment duties.
It was the unanimous opinion of the Court that there was
no causal relationship between the employee's work conditions
and his injury and that the risk of injury from the private
vehicle's "defective braking system was in nowise connected
with or incident to the employer-employee relationship."
Independent Contractor, Casual Employee or Employee as
Contemplated by Workmen's Compensation Law
The injured person was the regular employee of a truck-
ing company not licensed in interstate commerce. The de-
fendant in the case of DeBerry v. Coker Freight Lines,3 was
so licensed, and for the purpose of delivering freight to an
out of state point, leased from the owner a truck with the
injured workman as driver. In the course of unloading in
New Jersey the workman was injured.
The general rule as to the right or power of control of
a person for whom the work is being done as the criterion
for determination of an independent contractual relationship
was affirmed. It was concluded that such right or power
of control was vested in the defendant, so that the relation-
ship of employer-employee existed between defendant and the
injured party at the time of injury, so as to establish liability
on defendant under the Workmen's Compensation Law for
such injuries. The Court rejected the contention that the
injured party was a casual employee.
Payment of Benefits Awarded Pending Appeal-.
Limited Supersedeas
The Workmen's Compensation Law provides 4 that an
appeal may be taken from a decision of the Industrial Com-
mission to the Court of Common Pleas, but that such an
appeal shall operate as a supersedeas for thirty days only.
The Industrial Commission on March 22, 1958 directed the
employer to pay compensation benefits to the injured em-
ployee from March 22, 1957 for an indefinite period subject
to the maximum amount permitted by the statute ($10,-
000.00). After affirmance by the entire Commission the
employer appealed to the Court of Common Pleas and argu-
3. 234 S. C. 304, 108 S. E. 2nd 114 (1959).
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ments were heard by the Presiding Judge within the thirty
days as provided by statute but a decision was not rendered
by that court within such thirty day period. After the lapse
of the thirty day period, and prior to a decision by the
Presiding Judge on the appeal questions, the injured employee
applied and obtained from the Resident Judge an order re-
quiring the employer to pay the compensation benefits from
March 22, 1957 and to continue therewith pending the appeal.
In Godfrey v. Mills Mill," the prior decision of Bagwell V.
Ernest Burwell, Inc.6 was confirmed and the order requiring
payment of compensation was affirmed.
Burden of Proof
The employer questioned a ruling by the Industrial Com-
mission that the burden of proof was upon the employer to
establish that disability had ceased where an injured em-
ployee had signed a final receipt and was contending that
he had a continuing disability. The evidence was uncon-
tradicted that disability had not ceased so the Court saw
no necessity in passing upon the question as to the burden of
proof or effect of the final receipt. Godfrey v. Mills Mill.7
Exclusive Remedy of the Workmen's Compensation Law-
Statutory Employee
The case of Bell v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Com-
panys involved substantially a reaffirmation of sundry de-
cisions by the Supreme Court commencing with Marchbanks
v. Duke Power Company9 and concluding with Adams v.
Davison-Paxon Company.' The deceased employee was
employed by a construction company which contracted to re-
move certain transmission lines from poles under control of
the defendant and in the course of such work the deceased
received injuries from which he died. Workmen's compensa-
tion benefits were paid to the dependents of the deceased em-
ployee through the construction company by which he was
employed. The widow, on behalf of herself and the com-
pany paying the workmen's compensation benefits, then
5. 234 S. C. 401, 108 S. E. 2nd 587 (1959).
6. 227 S. C. 444, 87 S. E. 2nd 583 (1959).
7. 234 S. C. 442, 108 S. E. 2nd 832 (1959).
8. 234 S. C. 577, 109 S. E. 2nd 441 (1959).
9. 190 S. C. 336, 2 S. E. 2nd 825 (1939).
10. 230 S. C. 532, 96 S. E. 2nd (1957).
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brought action against the defendant as a third party pur-
suant to the provisions of the statute so enabling."-
The pertinent portion of the statute12 provides in sub-
stance that when any person undertakes to perform a part
of his own business and contracts with another person for
execution of a portion of the work, such former person shall
be liable to pay benefits to an injured workman employed in
performance of the work as if the workman were the em-
ployee of such former person. The decisions referred to
previously held that in such cases the injured workman
was a statutory employee of the person having the work
performed as the latter would be liable to the injured work-
man if the contractor was unable to respond for such injuries.
As the employee, or his dependents, have only one right,
and that under the Workmen's Compensation Law,13 recov-
ery against the defendant in this instance was denied since
the deceased would be the statutory employee of the de-
fendant, thus the collection of workmen's compensation bene-
fits, or the liability therefor, was the exclusive remedy avail-
able.
Waiver of Exemption by Employers Exempted From the
Workmen's Compensation Law
By a three to two decision the Supreme Court denied
workmen's compensation benefits in Carter v. Associated
Petroleum Carriers.'4 Duncan Oil Company (one of the de-
fendants) had only two employees and therefore was not auto-
matically covered by the Workmen's Compensation Law.'5
In order to become subject to the Workmen's Compensation
Law such company on October 3, 1955 contacted an insurance
agency which accepted an application from Duncan Oil Com-
pany for workmen's compensation insurance coverage. The
agent informed Duncan Oil Company that it was covered
for workmen's compensation purposes immediately. Two days
later, October 5, 1955, an employee of Duncan Oil Company
was fatally injured. Thereafter a representative of the in-
surance company which was to provide the workmen's com-
pensation insurance for Duncan Oil Company informed Mr.
11. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 72-124 (1952).
12. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 72-111 (1952).
13. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 72-121 (1952).
14. 235 S. C. 80, 110 S. E. 2nd 8 (1959).
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Duncan of the Duncan Oil Company that the company would
pay workmen's compensation benefits to the widow. How-
ever, the insurance company subsequently advised that the
application for workmen's compensation insurance had been
refused.
By statute0 an employer exempt from the provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation Law may become subject there-
to in the manner provided, but after notice of such election
is given the election does not become effective until "thirty
days after the date of such notice". As the deceased met his
death two days after the intention to operate under the Work-
men's Compensation Law was manifested, it was held that
no recovery could be made as the thirty day provision was
mandatory. The court pointed out that in view of the thirty
day provision of the statute for effective operation under the
Act after notice of intention to so do, the representatives of
the injured employee could have maintained a common law
action on account of injuries and death and that therefore the
thirty day provision should become effective for both the
employer and the employee and operation under the Work-
men's Compensation Act could not come about until the lapse
of that period of time. This was true notwithstanding the
verbal agreement of the insurance company to bind itself
under the Workmen's Compensation Law along with the
employer because the thirty day period of time was con-
sidered as written into the contract of insurance just as if
the provisions of the law were incorporated therein.
UnusuaZ Exertion or Strain
The deceased employee was a fire tower watchman for
the employer, a part of his work consisting of climbing the
steps of a fire tower approximately 100 feet in height both
morning and afternoon for the purpose of checking on possible
forest fires. He suffered from high blood pressure and a
possible coronary condition and several months before his
death had been hospitalized for such condition. On the day
in question he climbed the tower in the morning, climbed the
tower in the afternoon and on each occasion was subsequently
noticed to be nervous and tired. After supper he complained
of exhaustion and retired to bed where he was found shortly
thereafter dead. It was contended that his death arose
out of and in the course of his employment and while the
16. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 72-109 (1952).
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climbing of the tower was not normally an unusual act on
the part of the deceased, such became an act of unusual exer-
tion and strain in the instance of the deceased because of his
known physical condition. This contention was rejected by
a majority of the court in Sims v. S. C. State Commission of
Forestry.17 The court affirmed its prior enunciation in
the case of Price v. B. F. Shaw Company,'8 which in sub-
stance held that for a heart case to be compensable the attack
must have been induced by unusual strain or exertion at
work. The court said: "Here climbing up and down the
tower steps was not unusual in decedent's work; it was usual
and the very thing he had been doing for sixteen years and
until he became ill. How can it be said that it was an unusual
exertion or strain?"
Prejudice of Rights of Employer Against Third Parties
When a cause of action for damages against a third party
exists for injuries to an employee, such right of action is
assigned to the employer or its insurance carrier so that the
employer or carrier is in effect subrogated by statute to any
such right which the employee may have.1 9 In Stroy V. Mill-
wood Drug Store, Inc., 20 the employee while riding on a motor-
cycle was involved in an accident with a taxicab. Instead of
making claim for workmen's compensation benefits, the em-
ployee brought suit directly against the third party and trial
of the action resulted in a verdict for the taxicab company.
Thereafter the injured employee sought workmen's compensa-
tion benefits from his employer through the Industrial Com-
mission. Such benefits were granted by the Commission, but
the Circuit Judge set aside such award and rendered judg-
ment for the employer and its insurer. Such action of the
Circuit Judge was affirmed on the general basis that the
actions of the injured employee in processing the suit against
the third party were prejudicial to the subrogation or statu-
tory assignment to the employer and the carrier so that in
effect the employee had made an election to pursue the third
party and could not thereafter recover workmen's compensa-
tion benefits against his employer. The Court quoted with
approval from Larson on Workmen's Compensation,20a
17. 235 S. C. 1, 109 S. E. 2nd 701 (1959).
18. 224 S. C. 89, 77 S. E. 2nd 491 (1953).
19. CODE o LAWS OF SOUTH CARoLinA § 72-124 (1952).
20. 235 S. C. 52, 109 S. E. 2nd 706 (1959).
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"Since the object of third party statutes is to effect an
equitable adjustment of the rights of all the parties, it would
defeat this objective to allow the employee to demand com-
pensation from the employer after having destroyed the em-
ployer's normal right to obtain reimbursement from the
third party."
Change of Condition
An injured employee, upon proper notice, may have the
Industrial Commission review his case to ascertain if his
condition has worsened. Likewise the employer may give
notice to have a review of an injured employee's case to de-
termine if his condition has improved. "No such review shall
be made after twelve months from the date of the last pay-
ment of compensation." 21 Allen v. Benson Outdoor Advertis-
ing Company22 involved an employee who received his final
payment of compensation on November 7, 1957. On September
29, 1958, he notified the Industrial Commission of a request
that his case be reviewed on the basis of an alleged change of
condition. The hearing by the Commission pursuant to such
request was not held until November 19, 1958, almost fifty-
four weeks following the last payment of compensation, al-
though application to the Industrial Commission was made
prior to the expiration of one year from the date of such
last payment of compensation. It was contended by the em-
ployer that the Industrial Commission had no jurisdiction to
review the case as such review was not made within twelve
months from November 7th of the previous year. This con-
tention was rejected, the court holding that the filing of the
application for the review having taken place within one year
from the last payment of compensation, the requirement of
the statute was met.
Disablement From Occupational Disease
The first case in South Carolina considering the occupa-
tional disease provisions of the Workmen's Compensation
Law is Glenn v. Columbia Silica Sand Company.23 It was
admitted that the deceased employee was was covered by the
occupational disease provisions of the Law,24 the only issue
21. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 72-359 (1952).
22. 236 S. C. 22, 112 S. E. 2nd 722 (1960).
23. 236 S. C. 13, 112 S. E. 2nd 711 (1960).
24. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 72-251 (1952).
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being as to which of two insurance carriers were liable for the
workmen's compensation benefits. The Pennsylvania com-
pany insured the employer for workmen's compensation pur-
poses from May 19, 1950 through May 18, 1957. The Dixie
company insured the employer for such purposes subsequent
to May 18, 1957. The deceased employee worked with his
employer until approximately October 1, 1957 when he be-
came disabled from the disease of silicosis, a progressive dis-
ease that gradually increases in intensity over a period of
years. The court rejected the position of the Dixie company
that the liability should be at least prorated between the two
insurance companies by reason of the long and progressive
nature of the disease, culminating in disability only several
months after the Dixie company became the insurer on the
risk. The court held that under the specific statute defining
"disablement", 25 compensability in an occupational disease
of a pulmonary nature accrues when the disability occurs
and that as the employee had been injuriously exposed after
the Dixie company became the insurer and that as disability
did not occur until after such time, the entire liability was
that of the Dixie company.
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